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Background:  Since  2007  the  economic  recession  has  hit  most  industrial  countries  and  this  raises  the
question  of  how  economic  hardship  affects  illicit  drug  users’  decisions  to  enter  drug  treatment.
Methods:  We  test  the  hypothesis  that  an  improvement  in  the  employment  prospects,  as  measured  by
a  decline  in  unemployment,  strengthens  the  intrinsic  motivation  of  an  unemployed  drug  user  to enter
treatment.  Our  hypothesis  is  that  the  “payoff”  of  entering  treatment  increases  when  the  unemployed
drug  user  has  a  greater  probability  of  ﬁnding  a job.  We  reviewed  the  literature  and  found  considerable
evidence  to  substantiate  this  effect.  We  tested  the  hypothesis  econometrically  using  two  different  data
sets, one  EU-wide  and  one  German  data  set.
Results: Our  main  ﬁndings  were  that unemployment  has  a  signiﬁcant  negative  effect  on the  number  of
drug  users  entering  treatment,  i.e.  when  unemployment  declines  (increases)  the  number  of  drug  treat-
ment  clients  increases  (declines).  We  also  found  that  unemployed  drug  users  entering  treatment  are  most
sensitive to variations  in  the economy-wide  unemployment  rate.  Employed  drug  users,  in contrast,  are
not  inﬂuenced  by  these  variations  when  deciding  to  enter  treatment.
Conclusion:  Our  empirical  results  conﬁrm  that  the  creation  of  job  prospects  adds  signiﬁcantly  to  the  will-
ingness of  unemployed  drug  users  to  enter  treatment.  This  lends  support  to the  idea  that  drug  treatment
should  be  embedded  in  programmes  to  improve  the  job  prospects  of  drug  users.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Introduction
Unemployment in the European Union has increased sharply as
a result of the ﬁnancial crisis and as the recession continues, and
the unemployed fail to ﬁnd work, they lose part of their human
capital which makes it more difﬁcult to re-enter the labour market.
They become structurally unemployed.
Unemployment has an important inﬂuence on drug use. It is
useful to make a distinction between “being unemployed” at the
individual level and the aggregate unemployment rate. There is a
large literature studying the link between drug use and the indi-
vidual employment situation. This ﬁnds that causation runs in two
directions, i.e. a lack of employment is a factor that leads individuals
to more serious drug taking, whereas more serious drug involve-
ment works against stable and/or better paid employment. The
question of how macroeconomic employment prospects affect drug
use – as measured by the aggregate unemployment rate – is less
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well researched. Even less is known about the effects of the aggre-
gate unemployment rate on the probability of drug users entering
treatment and it is this issue that we address here.
Brief survey of the literature
Most of the empirical research has concentrated on how indi-
vidual employment and drug use are related and “individual
employment” is seen as a measure of social inclusion. Typical
examples of these studies are: Eisembach-Stangl, Moskalewicz,
and Thom (2009),  Buchmueller and Zuvekas (1998), Zarkin, Mroz,
Bray, and French (1998), MacDonald and Pudney (2000),  Pollack,
Danziger, Jayakody, and Seefeldt (2002),  French, Roebuck, and
Alexandre (2001),  March, Oviedo-Joekes, and Romero (2006),
DeSimone (2002) and Hoare (2009).  On the whole, these studies
strongly suggest that causality runs both ways, i.e. poor individ-
ual employment prospects enhance drug use, and intense drug use
signiﬁcantly reduce employability. A study that stands out as ﬁnd-
ing little robust relationship between drug use and employability
is Van Ours (2006).
To our knowledge the only published study analysing the rela-
tionship between the macroeconomic employment conditions and
drug use is Arkes (2007).  He estimated the impact of the economic
cycle on drug use amongst teenagers and concluded that a weaker
0955-3959/$ – see front matter ©  2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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economy leads to greater teenage cannabis and “hard–drug” use. He
also showed that teenagers were more likely to sell drugs in weaker
economies, which acts as a counter-cyclical mechanism facilitating
drug use in economic downturns.
Some studies have concentrated on how treatment affects the
probability of getting a job, i.e., Wickizer, Campbell, Krupski, and
Stark (2000) conﬁrmed that treatment has a positive effect on
“employability”. Meara (2006) and McCoy, Comerford, and Metsch
(2007) found that treatment tends to improve the earning status
of patients. However, the selection bias, whereby individuals who
are more conﬁdent of ﬁnding a job after treatment are more likely
to enter treatment, can lead to overestimating the effect of treat-
ment per se. This problem can be overcome by using randomised
sampling methods (see Heckman, 1979).
The reverse causality relation has also been analysed, and a
number of studies have noted the importance of paid employ-
ment as a key factor in sustaining recovery from drug dependency
(DeFulio, Donlin, Wong, & Silverman, 2009; Klee, McLean, &
Yavorsky, 2002; McIntosh, Bloor, & Robertson, 2008; Room,
1998; Westermeyer, 1989). Research has identiﬁed different ways
through which having a paid job contributes to an individual’s abil-
ity to create and sustain a drug free life (Cebulla, Smith, & Sutton,
2004). First, it enables the drug user to ﬁll time constructively and
become independent. Second, it helps users to reintegrate into a
wider network, facilitating the development of drug-free social
relationships. Third, it enhances an individual’s self-esteem. Finally,
it works as a symbol of the individual’s capacity to return to a more
conventional lifestyle.
Wong and Silverman (2007) discussed extensively which kinds
of treatment programmes were more adequate to employment-
based drugs users’ interventions. Employment status is frequently
used as an outcome in determining treatment efﬁcacy (see
Hermalin, Steer, Platt, & Melzerger, 1990). Some treatment includes
employment counselling or vocational rehabilitation courses as
part of the services provided to clients (Platt, 1995; Reif, Horgan,
Ritter, & Topmkins, 2004).
Some theoretical considerations
The number of drug users entering treatment at a particular
point in time is inﬂuenced by demand and supply factors. The
demand factors originate from the drug user. The decision to enter
treatment is determined by an intrinsic motivation, i.e. a desire
to free him/herself from a dependence that is perceived to reduce
his/her quality of life. This intrinsic motivation can, however, also
be inﬂuenced by external factors. According to EMCDDA (2010),
most clients enter treatment on their own initiative or as a result
of pressure from family and friends (43%); 27% are referred through
health or social services; around 20% are referred by the criminal
justice system, and the remaining through other referral sources.
Here we focus on one such factor: that is the state of the
economy, and more speciﬁcally the employment prospects for the
dependent person. The hypothesis that we test is as follows. An
improvement in the employment prospects induced for example
by a business cycle upturn, strengthens the intrinsic motivation of
a dependent unemployed person to seek treatment. The reason is
that the “payoff” of entering treatment increases when the unem-
ployed drug user has a greater probability of ﬁnding a job after
treatment. There is a large literature substantiating this effect (see
e.g. Biernacki, 1986; Cebulla et al., 2004; Luchansky, Brown, Longhi,
Stark, & Krupski, 2000; McIntosh et al., 2008). Paid employment
contributes to an individual’s ability to create a drug free life in
that it allows an individual to become economically independent,
to integrate in a wider social network and to boost self-esteem. All
this makes it more attractive for an unemployed drug user to seek
treatment when job prospects improve.
There are also supply factors affecting the number of drug users
seeking treatment. We  focus on the availability of treatment. The
more treatment centres that are available, the more drug users will
seek treatment. The supply of treatment is in turn inﬂuenced by the
state of the economy. When the economy is booming, government
revenues increase, making it more likely that additional treatment
centres become available (OECD, 2009). When the economy is in
recession, budgetary restrictions may  reduce the funding for drug
treatment thereby negatively affecting availability.
These demand and supply factors are discussed in the frame-
work of a simple model. By deﬁnition one can write the number of
individuals entering treatment in period t as follows:
Tt = tNt (1)
where Tt is the number of individuals entering treatment in period
t; t is the fraction of drug users entering treatment in period t and
Nt is the number of drug users in period t.
We  focused on how the state of the economy and more particu-
larly the employment prospects affect t and Nt in Eq. (1).  We  used
the economy-wide unemployment rate as the indicator of these
employment prospects. Thus the fraction of drug users, t, and
the number of drug users, Nt, are a function of the economy-wide
unemployment rate, Ut, i.e.
t = (Ut) (2)
Nt = N(Ut) (3)
Thus we  assumed implicitly that the unemployment rate is the
exogenous variable. There is of course also an inﬂuence of drug use
on the probability that an individual becomes unemployed. Since
Ut is the economy-wide unemployment rate, this reverse causality
is very small. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and totally differen-
tiating yields
dTt = Nt ∂t
∂Ut
dUt + t ∂Nt
∂Ut
dUt (4)
We discuss the signs of the partial derivatives in Eq. (4).
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (4) measures the impact
of unemployment on the fraction of drug users, t, seeking treat-
ment. We  made a distinction between the unemployed drug users
seeking treatment and those who  were employed because we
assumed that incentives for the jobless are different from the
employed. More speciﬁcally, as indicated above, our assumption
is that, if employment opportunities improve, unemployed drug
users will have more incentive to seek treatment so that this frac-
tion increases. We call this the incentive effect. It is not a priori
clear how employed drug users seeking treatment react to changes
in economic conditions. It will depend on how they perceive the
economic conditions to affect the probability of losing their jobs.
We let the data decide and assumed that
∂Ut
∂Ut
≤ 0
∂Et
∂Ut
≤?
where Ut is the share of unemployed drug users seeking treat-
ment, Et is the share of employed drug users seeking treatment
and Ut + Et = t.
There is a second potential mechanism whereby the state of
the economy (as represented by the rate of unemployment) may
affect t, namely the supply effect. An improvement in the state
of the economy also improves the government’s budget, allowing
for more spending on drug treatment. Thus when economic activ-
ity improves, the supply of treatment centres/units may increase.
This increased supply may  then lead to more drug users entering
treatment.
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Both the incentive and the supply effects work in the same direc-
tion, i.e. they tend to increase the number of drug treatment clients
when the state of the economy improves (unemployment declines).
The second term measures the impact of unemployment on
the number of drug users. There is a general presumption that an
increase in unemployment leads to more drug dependence. The
literature, however, shows that this depends on a range of factors,
including the type of drug, the ingestion method, the dependence
level or the quality of the available treatment. An improvement in
economic conditions and thus of job opportunities can increase or
decrease the number of drug users.
We  refer to the articles in this special focus issue, which describe
the different effects of the economy on drug use. Thus
∂Nt
∂Ut
≤ 0 or ≥ 0
We conclude that the effect of the state of the economy (as mea-
sured by the unemployment rate) on the number of drug users
entering treatment is ambiguous. Determining the sign of this effect
is thus an empirical issue.
In the empirical part, we concentrated on measuring the effect
of the state of the economy on the number of drug users entering
treatment. We  distinguished between employed and unemployed
drug users. This allowed us to determine which of the four effects
in Eq. (4) tended to dominate.
Description of the data
The treatment demand data published by the EMCDDA aims
to provide comparable, reliable and anonymous information con-
cerning the number and characteristics of people entering drug
treatment in Europe. The drugs considered are opiates, cocaine,
stimulants (amphetamines, MDMA  and others), hypnotics and
sedatives, hallucinogens, volatile inhalants and cannabis. Alcohol
is only registered when it is used as a secondary drug.
This data set provides the best available and harmonised infor-
mation at European level. In order to arrive at the current ﬁgures,
much time has been devoted to setting up a solid conceptual frame-
work and converging of the deﬁnitions used to collect these data.
In this study, treatment data referred to the total number of
clients who started treatment during the year (2002–2007). It
excluded those who started their treatment before the beginning of
the year. According to the EMCDDA protocol, the category “clients”
concerns those persons entering treatment during the calendar
year regardless of having been treated before (during their life-
time). In case multiple entrances occur, this client is only counted
once.
We  decided to exclude inpatient/residential services because
the data series available are considerably longer and involve a larger
number of countries. Additionally, most treatment provision occurs
in outpatient centres.
The data have some limitations and comparability across coun-
tries is limited. The coverage of the target institutions and the
percentage of total clients accounted for can differ from country
to country. Furthermore, these data include mostly clients who
beneﬁt from specialist treatment. As a result, they do not gener-
ally consider those receiving treatment from non-specialists such
as hospital emergency rooms, general practitioners, other primary
care or psychiatric services and low threshold facilities. These data
are described in more detail in the Data Description Document
(2011) (see reference for URL-address).
Given the limitations noted above, there could be biases in the
econometric estimates. These arise if there are systematic errors
in the sampling procedures. We  have no way of knowing how sys-
tematic these errors are. This is an area where future research will
be important.
This study uses the EMCCDA data where clients are split
into 6 main categories: “regular employment”, “pupil/student”,
“economically inactive (pensioners, housewives/-men, invalids)”,
“unemployed”, “other” and “not known”. The ﬁrst category con-
cerns those who  have a regular employment. It is important to note
that the deﬁnition of “regular employment” was  quite broad com-
prising persons with a regular licit job, part-time, undeclared work,
people working in the grey market and also those who  beneﬁt-
ted from public employment programmes (EMCDDA, 2000). Even
though there is guidance about coding those with irregular employ-
ment situations as “Other”, this is not always done in practice.
In order to analyse whether the decision to enter treatment
varies according to the primary drug used, we used another
EMCDDA dataset. This reports the number of clients entering
outpatient treatment, by country and by primary drug, annu-
ally (http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats10/tditab19a). However,
it should be stressed that this dataset is not fully comparable with
the previous one, because countries do not always provide infor-
mation on employment status or on the primary drug that a client
has been receiving treatment for.
Data on national treatment units, used to model the supply of
drug treatment, was obtained from the EMCDDA (2009a,b).  The
number of units refers to all outpatient and inpatient treatment
centres reported annually to the EMCDDA. There is a potential
endogeneity problem, i.e. there is a two-way causality between the
number of treatment centres and the number of drug users entering
treatment. This will tend to introduce a bias in the estimation of the
effect of the number of centres on the number of drug users enter-
ing treatment. In order to correct for this, the number of treatment
units is instrumented by the total health expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP and by the logarithm of the population of working age
(more details in the Data Description Document, 2011).
Data on rates of unemployment (both the structural and the
cyclical components) in different member countries were obtained
from the AMECO data set of the European Commission.
Whilst there was  some inconsistency in deﬁnitions of unem-
ployment, employment and inactive population between the
EMCDDA and AMECO databases, we consider AMECO was the best
available at the time of study.
In a later section we  tested results using another dataset. In order
to have a comparable set of variables, we  used German drug treat-
ment data, published by the IFT – Institut für Therapieforschung, for
the period 1988–2007. This provided detailed information on the
employment status of persons in treatment, grouped by the type
of drug used. The persons in treatment clustered into 3 aggregate
groups: employed, unemployed and inactive. We  tried to har-
monise the deﬁnitions of employment status used by the IFT with
the ones of the Eurostat and the International Labour Organization
(ILO). More information on the German data is available in the Data
Description Document (2011).
The empirical model and estimation results
We analysed empirically how the state of the economy, as mea-
sured by the economy wide unemployment rate, affects the number
of drug users entering outpatient treatment (drug clients). We  ﬁrst
analysed the total number of drug clients and then we  factored out
two  groups, the unemployed and the employed drug clients, thus
obtaining three econometric equations,
Tit = ˛i +  ˇ Uit + εit (5)
TUit = ˛i +  ˇ Uit + εit (6)
TEit = i + ı Uit + it (7)
where Tit is the total number of drug clients, TUit is the number
of unemployed drug clients and TEit is the number of employed
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drug clients in country i, in period t. The three variables were
expressed as a percentage of total population of working age in
country i, in period t. We  performed this normalisation process
because the explanatory variable, the unemployment rate, Uit,, is
also a percentage (i.e. the number of unemployed as a percent of
active population in country i, in period t). Thus, in what follows, Tit,
TUit and TEit are to be interpreted as fractions of total population.
We continue to use the shorthand “number of drug clients”.
Eqs. (5)–(7) have a panel data structure, i.e. they combine time
series and cross section data. We  estimated Eqs. (5)–(7) using a
ﬁxed effect model: ˛i and  i are the ﬁxed (country) effects. The
term “ﬁxed” should be interpreted as a country effect that does
not vary over time. These summarise the idiosyncratic effects orig-
inating from individual countries, e.g. cultural, social and political
peculiarities that have an affect on individuals in these countries
entering treatment and that are unrelated to the other explanatory
variables in the model. We  checked the validity of the ﬁxed effect
model against a random effect model and we rejected the latter
using the standard Hausmann-test.
It would have been interesting to check whether there were
country effects that varied over time. For example, some countries
saw a large increase in cocaine consumption during the sample
period. We  would have had to add country-time variables, but we
decided not to do this because of too great a loss in degrees of
freedom.
The results are shown in Tables 1–3.  It should be noted that the
results in Table 1 (total number of clients) are based on a larger sam-
ple of countries than the results in Tables 2 and 3. This is because
there were fewer countries providing information about the occu-
pation of the drug treatment clients.
First, the results with country ﬁxed effects are presented. Table 1
shows that most of the variation in the number of drug treatment
Table 1
Regression of drug clients on unemployment (Eq. (5)) (country ﬁxed effects).
Unemployment −0.000947*
(0.000523)
Country ﬁxed effects
Austria 0.0274**
(0.0116)
Latvia 0.0568***
(0.0111)
Bulgaria 0.0501***
(0.0128)
Lithuania 0.025**
(0.0115)
Cyprus 0.021**
(0.0115)
Luxembourg 0.015
(0.0111)
Cyprus 0.0464***
(0.0111)
Malta 0.0804***
(0.0108)
Czech Republic 0.0642***
(0.0107)
Netherlands 0.048***
(0.0107)
Denmark 0.0455***
(0.017)
Poland 0.0389***
(0.0126)
Finland 0.0281**
(0.0109)
Portugal 0.107
(0.0106)
France 0.026**
(0.0121)
Romania 0.012
(0.012)
Germany 0.0262**
(0.0108)
Slovakia 0.0384***
(0.012)
Greece 0.0306***
(0.0109)
Slovenia 0.036***
(0.0107)
Hungary 0.079***
(0.0107)
Spain 0.0802***
(0.0114)
Ireland 0.0788***
(0.0106)
Sweden 0.0256**
(0.0109)
Italy  0.0943***
(0.0108)
UK 0.125
(0.0102)
Observations 215
R2 0.829
R2 without ﬁxed effects 0.017
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 2
Regression of unemployed drug clients on unemployment (Eq. (6))  and regression
of  employed drug clients on unemployment (Eq. (7)) (country ﬁxed effects).
Unemployed (TUit) Employed (TEit)
Unemployment −0.0039*
(0.0022)
−0.0015
(0.0019)
R2 0.65 0.90
R2 (without ﬁxed effects) 0.05 0.01
Number of countries 22
Number of observations 83
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
clients is explained by country differences. This can be seen from
the difference between the total R2 and the R2 obtained without the
ﬁxed country effects. These can be due to factors such as differences
in drug demand reduction and social policies, treatment availabil-
ity, stages of the epidemics, prevalence rates, culture, per capita
income, age of population, etc. Second, we found that the unem-
ployment rate had a signiﬁcant (at 10% level) negative effect on the
total number of drug treatment clients, i.e. when unemployment
increases (declines) the number of drug clients seeking treatment
declines (increases).
Focusing on Table 2, we found that the unemployment rate
had a signiﬁcant (at 10% level) negative effect on the number of
unemployed drug clients seeking treatment (note that we did not
show the country ﬁxed effects; these are very similar, as in the
previous table). We  found no such signiﬁcant effect of the unem-
ployment rate on the number of employed drug clients seeking
treatment. Thus the effect of unemployment on the total number
of drug clients seems to come from its effect on the unemployed
drug treatment clients, as hypothesised above.
These results can be interpreted as follows. A decline in unem-
ployment increases the number of unemployed drug clients. This
increase is the result of the incentive effect (unemployed drug
users have better incentives to seek treatment when employment
prospects improve) and of the supply effect (better economic con-
ditions lead to an increase in the supply of treatment centres). The
results in Table 2 suggest that the incentive effect is probably the
more important one. If the supply effect was  important we  would
also ﬁnd that more employed drug users enter treatment when
economic conditions improve and we did not ﬁnd such an effect,
leading us to conclude that the negative sign we found in Table 1
most likely reﬂects the incentive effect. It is also consistent with the
study of Cebulla et al. (2004) showing that drug treatment providers
are viewed as a means to build trust between substance users and
employment providers.
It should be stressed that although the unemployment rate has
a signiﬁcant negative effect on the number of unemployed drug
users entering treatment, the quantitative importance of the unem-
ployment rate remains small. This can be seen from the low R2
obtained when we  excluded the country ﬁxed effects. This sug-
gests that there are other, probably stronger factors, determining
the decision of drug users to seek treatment. For an analysis of these
factors see, for example, Kemp and Neale (2005).
The next step consisted of splitting the unemployment rate
into a structural and cyclical component. There are different ways
to compute these components of unemployment. We  used the
AMECO data set of the European Commission (EC). The methodol-
ogy used by the EC involves computing the level of unemployment
that is consistent with price and wage stability. This leads to an
estimate of the NAWRU (the non-accelerating wage inﬂation rate
of unemployment). This can be interpreted as the structural unem-
ployment, i.e. the level of unemployment that is due to rigidities in
the labour market or other economic, regulatory or cultural imped-
iments. The cyclical component of unemployment is then obtained
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Table  3
Estimation of Eqs. (5)–(7) with structural and cyclical unemployment (ﬁxed effects).
Coefﬁcient of Total (Tit) Unemployed (TUit) Employed (TEit)
Structural unemployment −0.0141**
(0.0056)
−0.0052**
(0.0023)
−0.0030
(0.0020)
Cyclical unemployment 0.0181
(0.0117)
0.0036
(0.0049)
0.0071
(0.0041)
R2 0.82 0.77 0.93
R2 (without ﬁxed effects) 0.15 0.10 0.01
Number of countries 22 22 22
Number of observations 83 83 83
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.05.
by taking the difference between the observed unemployment rate
and the NAWRU.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3 (we have omitted
the estimations of the ﬁxed effects as these were very similar to the
ones shown in Table 1). We  concluded (see Table 3) that the neg-
ative effect of unemployment on the total number of drug clients
comes exclusively from the structural component of unemploy-
ment. This is now signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The cyclical component
of unemployment has no signiﬁcant effect on the total number
of drug treatment clients. Only structural improvements in labour
market conditions lead to an improved long-term employment out-
look and give sufﬁcient incentives to drug users to seek treatment.
These results also suggest that drug users are aware that durable
employment prospects matter more than temporary ones in their
decision to seek treatment.
The effect of unemployment on the total number of drug treat-
ments is due to the fact that low unemployment (better job
opportunities) increases the number of unemployed drug users
entering treatment, whilst leaving the number of employed drug
users entering treatment unaffected. By comparing columns 2 and
3 in Table 3 we can see that parameter of structural unemployment
is signiﬁcantly associated with the unemployed treatment clients,
whilst it is non-signiﬁcant for the employed clients.
We then distinguished between cocaine, cannabis, heroin and
other drugs. Because of lack of data we could not, however, distin-
guish between unemployed and employed drug clients. This is an
important drawback because, as we have shown earlier, the incen-
tives of unemployed and employed drug users in seeking treatment
may  be very different. Nevertheless it may  be useful to check for
the different reactions of drug treatment clients, depending on type
of drug used.
Drug users are not a homogeneous group and it cannot be
assumed that all share the same barriers or incentives when react-
ing to external factors, such as the rate of unemployment. French
et al. (2001) have also shown that whilst chronic drug use was sig-
niﬁcantly negatively related to employment, non-chronic drug use
was not. In the case of treatment analysed here, there is a very
high probability that all clients have some degree of dependency.
However, its level varies according to the drug used and the level
of dependence. In order to have an even better insight into drug
clients’ behaviour, it would be interesting to have information on
their different stages of dependence, and to take into account what
other substances they are using or being treated for.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. For cocaine and
cannabis the results were similar to those obtained earlier, i.e. an
improvement in labour market conditions (decline in unemploy-
ment) leads to an increase in drug treatment clients. This effect
comes mostly from the structural component of unemployment.
For heroin, we found a positive and signiﬁcant effect of unem-
ployment on the number of drug treatment clients. This may be
related to the fact that heroin users tend to be problematic drug
users for which the incentive effect is very weak, since the nega-
tive effect of drug use in more dependent users strongly reduces
their ability to obtain and maintain regular employment (Cebulla
et al., 2004). UKDPC (2008) stresses the need to stabilise drug use, to
treat physical and mental health problems, to build motivation and
aspirations, and to provide appropriate stable accommodation as
minimal factors required before many problem drug users will be in
a position to participate in the formal job market. This is most likely
coupled with the possibility that deteriorating economic conditions
have a positive effect on the number of heroin users (the term Nit
in Eq. (4)). The estimated coefﬁcients for the new stimulants are
negative but not signiﬁcant. Again this may  be due to the lack of
disaggregation between unemployed and employed drug clients.
We also focused on the effect of supply factors. In particular
when the supply of treatment centres increases, this is likely to have
a positive effect on the number of drug users entering treatment.
We tested this hypothesis. The equations to be estimated now
become:
Tit = ˛i +  ˇ Uit + ˇSSit + εit (8)
Tit = ˛i + ˇCUCit + ˇNUNit + ˇSSit + εit (9)
TUit = ˛i + ˇCUCit + ˇNUNit + ˇSSit + it (10)
TEit = i + ˇCUCit + ıNUNit + ˇSSit + it (11)
where Sit is the number of treatment centres in country i and period
t. We  instrumented this variable using the share of government
spending on health in country i and period t. Eq. (8) regresses the
number of treatment clients on the total unemployment rate (as we
Table 4
Regression of total drug clients (by drug use) on cyclical and structural unemployment: (ﬁxed effects).
Cocaine Cannabis Heroin New stimulants
Structural unemployment −1.195***
(0.462)
−1.419***
(0.439)
3.123***
(0.739)
−0.113
(0.175)
Cyclical unemployment −1.522**
(0.650)
0.560
(0.619)
1.373
(1.041)
−0.284
(0.248)
R2 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.98
R2 (without ﬁxed effects) 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.02
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 5
Estimation results with supply of treatment centres.
OLS ﬁxed effect IV ﬁxed effect
Unemployment −0.0013**
(0.0005)
Structural unemployment −0.0006
(0.0008)
−0.0001
(0.0007)
0.0005
(0.0019)
0.0019
(0.0026)
Cyclical unemployment −0.0026**
(0.001)
−0.0021**
(0.0010)
−0.0122*
(0.0068)
−0.0120
(0.0093)
Supply treatment centres 2.788***
(0.942)
2.905***
(1.95)
2.528
(1.942)
2.207***
(0.705)
2.475**
(1.067)
R2 0.815 0.817
R2 (without ﬁxed effects) 0.076 0.085
Number of countries 22 22 20 17 17
Number of observations 192 192 170 64 64
Note: standard errors in parentheses. R2 is not reported for the IV model because it has no statistical meaning in the context of the two-stage least squares technique (the
model’s  residuals are computed over a set of regressors different from those used in the model). Number of observations drops for the IV models due to the missing data on
health  expenditure for (for Eq. (9)) and on labour status of drug clients (Eqs. (10) and (11)).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.01.
did in Eq. (5)); Eq. (9) regresses the number of treatment clients on
the cyclical and structural components of the unemployment rate;
and Eqs. (10) and (11) do the same for the shares of unemployed
and employed drug clients in the total population of working age.
The results are shown in Table 5.
Causality issues
An important econometric problem that arises here is the two-
way causality between the number of treatment centres and the
number of drug users entering treatment. As a result of this, a
regression of the number of drug clients on the number of treat-
ment centres is not an appropriate procedure because the latter
variable is not exogenous in such a regression. In order to account
for the fact that the variable which measures the supply of drug
treatment might be endogenous, we have used the instrumental
variable (IV) approach. We  selected two instrumental variables.
The ﬁrst is the log of country-wide population. This is based on
the assumption that the number of inhabitants in a country does
not inﬂuence directly the share of problem drug users who demand
treatment, but only through the number of treatment centres in a
country (Carlsen & Grytten, 1998; Dranove & Wehner, 1994). There
is some evidence that the size of the youth cohort in a jurisdic-
tion is positively related to cannabis consumption (Jacobson, 2004).
Since this increase in consumption could lead to an increase in the
demand for outpatient treatment, this could reduce the quality of
this instrument. Since out instrument is the total population in a
country, this effect is considerably reduced.
The second instrument, included into regression equations, is
the total expenditure on healthcare as percentage of GDP (data
obtained from the health statistics collected by the World Health
Organization). We  use this variable as our instrument because it
is correlated with the number of treatment centres (the indepen-
dent variable, corr = −0.293) whilst it is little correlated with the
number of drug clients (dependent variable, corr = −0.029). There
are, of course, mechanisms that could lead to a correlation between
the number of drug clients and health expenditure: for example, an
increase in health spending may  be positively correlated with the
number of intensive treatment and detoxiﬁcation slots available in
hospital settings, which could inﬂuence the number of outpatient
clients in non-hospital settings.
An increase in health spending may  be positively correlated
with the number of inpatient beds available in non-hospital set-
tings, which could inﬂuence the number of outpatient clients in
non-hospital settings.
An  increase in health spending may  be positively correlated
with advertising and outreach activities (e.g., syringe exchange
programmes) intended to increase treatment entry. However, the
effects of these mechanisms are not always clear, and the inﬂuences
may go in opposite directions. That is why  we found a low correla-
tion between the number of drug clients and health expenditure.
We tested for the statistical validity of instruments in two ways.
First, in line with Dranove and Wehner (1994),  for an instrument to
be valid, the correlation between the residuals of the OLS estimation
and the instrument has to be low and insigniﬁcant. In other words,
a valid instrument does not improve the OLS model’s ﬁt if included
into the equation. We found low correlations for both instruments:
0.139 for the population and 0.113 for the health expenditure. Sec-
ond, the statistical validity of instruments can be checked by testing
for over-identifying restrictions using the Hansen J-statistics. Note
that this is a joint test on the validity of the instrumental variables.
We found that instruments jointly pass the Hansen J test at the 5%
signiﬁcance level.
Both population and health expenditure measures appear to be
relatively weak instruments and thus give a biased estimate of the
effect of the supply variable (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Staiger
and Stock, 1997). This problem, however, does not bias the main
estimation results concerning the relevance of the labour market
conditions for an individuals’ decision to demand drug treatment.
This is because the general labour market conditions can safely
be assumed to be exogenous with respect to the dependent vari-
able, outpatient treatment, i.e. it is safe to assume that the number
of outpatient treatments in a country does not inﬂuence general
economic conditions in that country.
The results of the estimation using these instrumental variables
are shown in Table 5.
We found that the number of treatment centres had the
expected positive effect on the number of drug clients and was
highly signiﬁcant. The unemployment rate had a signiﬁcant nega-
tive effect on the total number of treatment clients. In contrast to
our previous results, though, this negative effect came mainly from
the cyclical component of unemployment.
We  performed two  robustness cheques of the estimation
results: (a) we  modelled labour market conditions by the country-
speciﬁc employment level and (b) ran additional regressions for the
shares of unemployed and inactive drug clients in the total popula-
tion of working age. The latter check was motivated by the unclear
distinction between unemployed and inactive clients in treatment
in the EMCDDA data. In both cases our results were consistent with
the main ﬁndings.
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Table  6
Estimation results for Germany (Eqs. (12)–(14)): instrumental variable method.
Eq. (12) total drug clients Eq. (13) unemployed drug clients Eq. (14) employed drug clients
Drug type cyclical unemployment effects
Cannabinoids 0.000726 0.00004 0.000821
Cocaine −0.00217 −0.00132* −0.00003
Hallucinogens −0.00278 −0.00174** −0.000282
Opiods 0.00264 0.00310 0.000487
Psycotrop sust 0.000322 −0.00169** −0.000224
Sedative-hypnotics −0.00265 −0.00167** −0.000257
Stimulants 0.000314 −0.00151* 0.00003
volatile solvents −0.00047 −0.00195** −0.000293
Drug  type structural unemployment effects
Cannabinoids 0.00458 −0.000383 0.000240*
Cocaine −0.0139* −0.000628*** 0.00001
Hallucinogens −0.0164* −0.000742** −0.000105
Opiods −0.00095 0.000422 0.000803***
Psycotrop sust −0.0400 −0.000756*** −0.00009
Sedative-hypnotics −0.0160* −0.000717*** −0.00005
Stimulants −0.0349 −0.000671*** 0.00005
Volatile solvents −0.0368 −0.000799*** −0.000120
Treatment supply ˇS 12.32** 5.861*** 0.881
Observations 74 74 74
R2 0.350 0.786 0.852
Note: We use the share of health expenditures in GDP as the instrumental variable.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01
Empirical analysis using German data
Here we used a German data set to test our main hypothesis. This
dataset disaggregated information of treatment by type of drug,
which allowed us to ﬁnd out whether the effect of unemployment
on treatment differed by drug used. These data are described in
Data Description Document (2011).
We  proceeded in the same way as European in the empirical
analysis, ﬁrst presenting regression results using the total treat-
ment clients, and then the results using unemployed and employed
drug clients. The equations we want to estimate are speciﬁed as
follows:
Tkt =  ˛ + ˇCkUCi ∗ Dk + ˇNkUNt ∗ Dk + ˇSSt + εkt (12)
TUkt =  + CkUCi ∗ Dk + NkUNt ∗ Dk + SSt + kt (13)
TEkt = ı + ıCkUCi ∗ Dk + ıNkUNt ∗ Dk + ıSSt + kt (14)
where Tkt is the total number of drug clients using drug k in period
t, as percent of population of working age; TUkt is the unem-
ployed number of drug clients; TEkt is the employed number of drug
clients; UCt and UNt are the cyclical and structural components of
unemployment in Germany in period t. Each of these two unem-
ployment variables is multiplied by a matrix of dummy  variables
Dk that takes on the value of 1 when the observation relates to the
drug type k. This allowed us to estimate the drug speciﬁc effects of
unemployment on treatment ˇCk, ˇNk, Ck, Nk, ıCk, ıNk. Finally, St
measured the supply of treatment centres in Germany in period
t. Because of the potential of reverse causality (number of drug
clients causing the number of treatment centres to increase) we
used instrumental variables (IVs). We  selected two such IVs – total
health expenditure as a percent of GDP and the log of population.
The results are shown in Table 6.
They were in line with our previous results. First, changes in
unemployment affected the decisions of unemployed drug users
to enter treatment and not the employed drug users (comparing
the second and the third columns in Table 6). We  observed that
the signiﬁcant negative effects were all to be found in the second
column measuring the impact of unemployment on the number on
unemployed treatment clients. We  found no signiﬁcant negative
effects in the third column measuring the impact of unemployment
on employed treatment clients. This conﬁrmed our hypothesis that
improved labour market prospects gives incentives to unemployed
– but not to employed – drug users to seek treatment. The result
of these opposing effects is that the effect of unemployment on the
total number of treatment clients is weak. This can be seen from
the ﬁrst column. Although we found that most coefﬁcients were
negative, few were signiﬁcant.
A second result in Table 6 showed that most of the action comes
from the structural component of unemployment. We can see from
column 2 that most of the signiﬁcant effects of unemployment on
the number of drug clients are concentrated in the structural com-
ponent of unemployment, although we  also found that the cyclical
component of unemployment affects the decision of unemployed
drug users to seek treatment.
Third, we  also found that users using opiates seem to be insen-
sitive to movements of unemployment in their decision to seek
treatment. We  noted earlier that heroin users are very problematic
drug users for which the incentive effect to look for a job when job
prospects improve is very weak.
Finally we  wanted to know how economically signiﬁcant these
effects were. Statistical signiﬁcance is important, but one is also
interested in the economic signiﬁcance of the effects, i.e. in their
quantitative importance. If the latter are small, the statistical signif-
icance is of little practical relevance. We  computed the quantitative
effects of the structural unemployment rate on the treatment num-
bers in Table 7. These quantitative effects were obtained by using
the estimated coefﬁcients in Table 6 and applying them on the mean
numbers treatment data. We  observed that a one percent point
decline in the German unemployment rate leads to an increase
in the number of persons seeking treatment by 2.5–5.3%. (Note
Table 7
Quantitative effect of a one percent point decline in German unemployment rate on
the  number of drug clients (in percent).
Cannabinoids 2.57%
Cocaine 4.21%
Hallucinogens 4.98%
Opioids 2.83%
Psycotrop sust 5.07%
Sedative-hypnotics 4.81%
Stimulants 4.50%
Volatile solvents 5.36%
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that this may  seem to be large effects given that the coefﬁcients
in Table 6 are very small. The dependent variable, however, is the
share of treatment clients in total population. Thus a small change
in that share translates into a relatively large change in the num-
ber of treatment clients.) Considering that from the bottom of a
recession to the peak of a boom, the unemployment rate typi-
cally declines by approximately 3%, we obtained movements in the
treatment numbers from 7.5% to 16%.
Conclusion
The decision of drug users to enter treatment is inﬂuenced by
many factors, including personal motivation and various external
factors. One of these external factors is the state of the economy,
and more speciﬁcally, the employment prospects for the drug user.
Our hypothesis was that the “payoff” for entering treatment
increases when the unemployed drug user has a greater prob-
ability of ﬁnding a job after treatment. The research literature
certainly suggests that paid employment contributes to an individ-
ual’s ability to create a drug free life, making it possible to become
economically independent, to integrate into a wider social network
and to boost self-esteem.
We  tested this hypothesis econometrically using two  different
datasets – an EU-wide and German dataset. Our main ﬁndings
were that unemployment has a signiﬁcant negative effect on the
number of drug users entering treatment. In general we found
that the structural component of unemployment has a stronger
impact on the number of treatment clients, i.e. when the number
of structural unemployed declines (increases) the number of drug
clients increases (declines). The cyclical component of unemploy-
ment generally has a weaker effect on the number of drug clients.
The latter makes sense: when unemployment declines temporarily
this is likely to have a weaker impact on the decision of drug users
to seek treatment than when unemployment declines structurally.
We also found that unemployed drug users seeking treatment
are more sensitive than employed drug users to variations in the
economy-wide unemployment rate.
Whilst our empirical results are encouraging, there is certainly
more research to be done to check their robustness. This is espe-
cially the case as the quality of the data is far from perfect.
Nevertheless some policy conclusions can be drawn. Our empirical
results conﬁrm that the creation of job prospects adds signiﬁcantly
to the willingness of unemployed drug users to see k treatment.
This lends support to the idea that employment programmes need
to be integral to drug treatment interventions.
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